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LOSS OF FORCED COOLING FLOW IN THE PLUM BROOK REACTOR* 
by H. B. Barkley, Jr. 
Lewis Research Center 
Plum Brook Station 
SUMMARY 
Prevention of the "loss of flow" and "loss of coolantM accidents continues to have 
major technical and economic inf luenc~ on nuclear power plant design and operation. 
Realistic assessment of the mechanisms and consequences of the accidents is being given 
much attention (e. g. , the AEC LOFT facilities and analyses). The Plum Brook Reactor 
(PBR) experienced a temporary loss of forced-cooling flow. The analyses conducted and 
conclusions reached after conditions previously analyzed were exceeded may have appli- 
cation to other plants. 
On November 22, 1966, following about 7 days of operation a t  full power of 60 mega- 
watts (th), the Plum Brook Reactor experienced a temporary loss of forced-cooling flow, 
initiated by interruption of dc control power to the primary main and shutdown coolant 
pump breakers. The control power breaker was accidenfally opened. An automatic 
pump interlock scram occurred within 1 second after the breaker was opened. Previous 
hydraulic testing demonstrated that forced flow from coastdown persisted for  a t  least 30 
seconds. For  ced-cooling flow was restored within an additional 45 seconds. 
The paper f i r s t  gives a brief background description of the Plum Brook Reactor to 
provide a framework for  understanding the occurrence. Then the causes of the occur- 
rence a r e  presented, followed by a description of the inspections, analyses, and evalua- 
tions conducted. The presence o r  extent of any damage was assessed, and safety for  r e -  
start was assured. Other reviews and evaluations were conducted to determine the pro- 
per  follow-up corrective action. The corrective actions taken to prevent a recurrence 
a r e  summarized. 
It is concluded in this case that an undesired rather than an unsafe condition existed. 
The investigation and actions taken have avoided recurrence to date, and i t  is believed 
are sufficient to avoid recurrence in the future. 
*Presented a t  AMS Topical Meeting on Reactor Operating Experience, San Juan, 
Puerto Rico, Qet. 1-3, 1969. 
Considerable attention is properly being given to a realistic assessment of the 
mechanisms and consequences of the "loss of flow" accident in nuclear power plants. 
Lack of complete information leads to designs with rather elaborate and redundant pre-  
cautions against loss of flow, and conservative protection against the worst  conceivable 
consequences. Thus, the ? ' loss of floww accident has considerable practical and econo- 
mic impact on the design and operation of the nuclear power plant. 
The Plum Brook Reactor (BBR) experienced a temporary loss of forced-cooling flow, 
and conditions which exceeded those previously analyzed were reached. To provide a 
framework for  understanding the occurrence, we start with a brief description of the 
PBR, its electrical distribution system, and methods for  maintaining flow. The paper 
then treats the occurrence in three parts, (1) causes; (2) inspections, analyses, and 
evaluations to a s sess  the presence o r  extent of any damage and safety for  restart ,  and 
to determine the proper corrective action to be  taken; and (3) the corrective actions 
taken. 
BACKGROUND DESCRIPTION 
Reactor Core and Reactor Tank Assembly 
The Plum Brook Reactor (PBR) is a 60 megawatt (th) pressurized water test reac-  
tor. Figure 1 illustrates the layout of the reactor core and instrument and experiment 
facilities. Within the core box can be  seen the 3x9 a r r a y  of fuel elements, surrounded 
on three sides by a single row of beryllium tfL-piecew reflectors, and on the fourth side 
by four rows of beryllium s'R-piece?l reflectors. Normal cooling water flow has two 
upward paths, through the R reflector and past the experiment facilities; and all water 
passes downward through the L reflector and fuel elements. The fuel elements a r e  of 
the MTR curved plate type, with 20 mils of aluminum cladding on a uranium-aluminum 
6 
alloy. At the hottest spot in the fuel the nominal heat flux is 1.4X10 Btu per  hour per 
square foot with a corresponding fuel element temperature of 325' F (less than satura- 
tion temperature). The steady -state departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) is 
greater  than 2, and the transient DNBR is greater  than 1.3. 
Figure 2 shows the reactor core located in the reactor tank. This provides a per-  
spective view of the reactor, and the instrument and experiment facilities. The direc- 
tion of normal flow can also be seen, upward past the experiment thimbles and through 
the R reflector, and downward through the L reflector and fuel elements. 
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Figure 1. - Horizontal section of reactor core. (Dimensions are i n  inches.) 
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Figure 2. - Reactor tank assembly.' 
Electrical Dist rioution System 
Figure 3 is a simplkfied schematic of the portion of the electrical distribution sys-  
tem that concerns reactor coolant flow, a t  the time of the temporary loss of forced- 
cooling flow. (Some changes "cat were unrelated. to the occurrence have subsequently 
been made. ) Commercial power comes in to two buses through the "North Linet' and 
the "Seuth Line. ? ?  These two buses a r e  normally separated, but automatically tie to- 
gether on loss of either the North o r  the South Line. The Emergency Power bus is 
normally fed through one of two breakers, from either the North o r  the South Commer- 
cial Power bus. A key interlock prevents both breakers from being closed simultaneously 
and tying the North and South Lines. Diesel generators run partly loaded on the Emer -  
gency Power bus in parallel with commercial power. On loss of commercial power, the 
Emergency Power bus is automatically separated from the Commercial Power bus, and 
the Diesels power the necessary loads. The Guaranteed Power bus is a dc bus. It is 
normally fed through inverters-diverters from the Emergency Power bus. Additionally, 
however, batteries power this bus as a backup for  the unlikely loss of emergency power. 
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Figure 3. - Simplif ied electrical d ist r ibut ion system. (n .c . ,  normal ly 
closed; n.o., normal ly open. 
Flow Systems 
The PBR Pr imary  Cooling Water System has two flow loops, a main and a shutdown. 
The primary main cooling water loop has three pumps, with two sufficient to provide 
full flow of 17 000 gpm for  full reactor power. Two main coolant pumps a r e  powered 
from the North Commercial Power bus, and one from the South Commercial Power bus. 
A normal operating mode is to run two pumps, one from each bus. The third pump is 
in standby and automatically starts if either of the running pumps is lost. The primary 
shutdown cooling water loop has two pumps, with either capable of providing sufficient 
flow (>I000 gpm) for cooling after a scram from prolonged full power operation. The 
shutdown coolant pumps a r e  powered from the Emergency Power bus. One pump is run 
whenever the reactor  is operating, and the other pump automatically s t a r t s  if the first 
pump is lost. Control power fo r  both the main and the shutdown coolant pumps comes 
from the dc Guaranteed Power bus. 
A third source of flow, emergency flow, is available for  the extremely unlikely loss 
of both main and shutdown cooling flow. This system provides water by gravity feed 
from an overhead storage tank through the reflector and core and out a drain to hot r e -  
tention tanks. This system is activated by three buttons in the control room which 
actuate motor operated valves powered from the dc Guaranteed Power bus. 
As mentioned above, the normal reactor operating mode is with two main coolant 
pumps and one shutdown coolant pump running. The reactor has the customary sc rams  
f rom low flow and core A P .  Additionally, anticipatory protection is provided for  the 
reactor for  off -normal flow conditions. If one main coolant pump is temporarily lost 
for  any reason, a l l  the control rods a r e  automatically inserted a t  a fas t  rate. If both 
main coolant pumps a r e  lost, a pump interlock reactor scram is actuated in just less  
than 1 second. The fas t  rod insertion and the 1 second delay of the scram avoid un- 
necessary reactor shutdowns fo r  transients or  conditions that can be quickly corrected 
by automatic switching (e. g . ,  tie breaker closure o r  s t a r t  of a standby pump). Thus, 
if f o r  any reason all main cooling flow is lost, the reactor scrams;  and shutdown cool- 
ing flow is provided by a shutdown coolant pump. In the unlikely event shutdown cooling 
flow is also lost, the reactor operator institutes emergency flow by pressing the three 
buttons in the control room. Since previous hydraulic testing demonstrated that forced 
flow f rom coastdown persists fo r  a t  least 30 seconds, the operator has 30 seconds after 
a scram to verify the presence of flow or to actuate emergency cooling. 
LOSS OF FORCED COOLING FLOW 
On November 22, 1966, following about 7 days of operation at full power of 60 mega- 
watts (th), the Plum Brook Reactor experienced a temporary loss of forced cooling flow, 
initiated by interruption of dc control power to the primary main and shutdown coolant 
pump breakers. The control power breaker was accidentally opened. An automatic 
pump interlock scram occurred within 1 second after the breaker was opened. Previous 
hydraulic testing demonstrated that forced flow from coastdown persisted for  a t  least 
30 seconds. Forced cooling flow was restored within an additional 45 seconds. 
Causes 
This potentially serious occurrence followed the classic pattern, where the conse- 
quences of an improbable event a r e  compounded by multiple additional e r ro r s .  The 
occurrence was caused by a combination of design e r r o r s  and operator e r ro r s .  
There were three design e r ro r s .  (1) Too many vital control power circuits on one 
breaker. Dc control power to all of the main and shutdown coolant pump breakers orig- 
inated from one breaker on the Guaranteed Power bus. (2) Improper breaker action on 
loss and restoration of breaker control power. Although the control power breaker was 
reclosed within a few seconds after i t s  accidental opening, restoration of the control 
power did not r e s t a r t  any pumps. The reactor operator had to r e s t a r t  pumps by pres-  
sing buttons in the control room. (3) Inadequate physical protection for  the breaker 
handles on some vital breakers. This single vital control power breaker handle had no 
physical protection covering it to prevent inadvertent operation. 
Three operator e r r o r s  were evidenced. (1) Carelessness by the electrical operator 
who inadvertently tripped the breaker. (2) Failure of the electrical operator to report  
the condition to the reactor control room, even though he immediately reclosed the 
breaker. (3) Failure of the reactor operators to recognize immediately that a loss of 
flow condition had occurred, and therefore failure to take immediate proper emergency 
action. It should be noted that although operator e r r o r  contributed to the occurrence, i t  
was good operator performance that restored conditions to normal and prevented the 
occurrence from lasting any longer than i t  did. 
Inspections, Analyses, and Evaluations 
The inspections, analyses, and evaluations of the occurrence can be divided into 
two phases, (1) the immediate, necessary to a s sess  the presence o r  extent of any 
damage, and the safety for  restart ,  and (2) the subsequent o r  follow-up, to determine 
all necessary corrective action to prevent recurrence and any other important corollary 
changes or actions suggested by the occurrence. 
The f i r s t  phase of the evaluation included the following. It was first determined 
that there was no increase in the primary cooling water fission product activity follow- 
ing the Occurrence. To confirm that no damage had occurred, we performed significant 
analyses and inspections to systematically consider all  of the reactor core components, 
and instruments and experiments (see figs. 1 and 2). The exact model for  convective 
core cooling was not known. Therefore, we calculated the minimum departure from 
nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) assuming free-convective flow. This analysis yielded a 
DNB ratio of at least 2. Four fuel elements located in the central region of the core in 
locations of the highest heat flux were visually inspected in the reactor tank. There was 
no evidence of warpage, blistering, coolant channel blockage, loss of clad integrity, o r  
abnormal discoloration. Subsequently, al l  22 standard and five control follower elements 
were removed without difficulty, visually inspected, and placed in storage. Analysis of 
the beryllium reflector pieces, assuming no heat removal, established their maximum 
possible temperature at 600' F. Visual inspection of a beryllium piece showed no 
damage. The cadmium absorber section of the central fueled shim safety control rod 
(no. 3) was examined in the Hot Laboratory. There was no warpage, deformation, dis- 
coloration, or indication of any abnormality. One of the experiment thimbles (KB-3) con- 
tains a collimator. A helium leak check of the collimator and shutter system revealed 
no leakage. Inspection and/or analysis of a titanium clad tungsten shield in the HB-2 
experiment thimble, of an instrument thimble bismuth shield, and of experiments evi- 
denced no damage. Selected reactor material irradiation surveillance specimens were 
removed f o r  testing. There were no measurable changes in the specimens attributable 
to the loss of flow occurrence. Our Safeguards Committee concurred that the actions 
taken were sufficient fo r  restart .  Pr ior  to res tar t  with a new core, rod drop tes ts  con- 
firmed normal rod drop times. Rod worth measurement on res tar t  yielded proper 
values. 
Subsequent review and evaluation included the following. All important electrical 
components were reviewed for  optimum separation of control power sources and 
breakers. The shutdown coolant pump and other important breakers were reviewed fo r  
proper breaker action on loss and restoration of control power. All vital breakers were 
reexamined for physical protection needed to prevent inadvertent tripping (but not to 
hamper deliberate operation). Operating procedures were reviewed for  any necessary 
changes. The layout of the facility alarm panels was reviewed for  any changes which 
would facilitate the operatorq s interpretation o r  recognition of the most important abnor - 
ma1 situations. Emergency actions associated with the relatively few fundamental and 
vital elements of reactor safety (cooling water flow and pressure, reactor power, con- 
t rol  rod position) were reviewed for  any possible improvements, with particular empha- 
s i s  given to methods for  achieving almost instinctive operator reaction. The condition 
of the fuel elements in the core during the occurrence was assessed. 
Correc"rve Actions 
As a resu l t  of the review and evaluation occasioned by the loss  of forced cooling 
flow occurrence, we took the following actions. The dc control power for  the three  
main and two shutdown coolant pumps was  rewired s o  that each pump breaker  and the 
automatic switching circuitry received control power through separate  breakers .  We 
separated the a c  feed of the two shutdown coolant pumps s o  that they were  not both fed 
f rom a single breaker ,  We provided fo r  automatic r e s t a r t  of the shutdown coolant 
pumps when power is restored. The dc  control and operator power sources for  each of 
the emergency coolant valves were  combined, and each of these valves was supplied 
f rom a separate  breaker .  All vital c i rcui t  b reakers  were  provided with physical protec- 
tion to  prevent inadvertent tripping. A single switch was  installed on the control room 
console to activate all of the valves required fo r  emergency cooling. A flow limiting 
orifice was installed downstream of the reactor  tank drain valve to  automatically l imit 
the flow of emergency cooling water, avoiding the need to open the drain valve a speci-  
fied amount. The control room annunciator windows for  "primary main flow off -normalP? 
and the "primary shutdown flow off -normal1' were outlined in  r e d  to make them stand 
out f rom the other a la rms .  We ran severa l  additional dr i l l s  f o r  each shift team t o  in-  
s u r e  that all personnel recognize and know what to do if emergency cooling should be-  
come necessary o r  other abnormalities occur in the relatively few fundamental elements 
of reactor  safety. We discussed with all reactor  operators  the circumstances and  po- 
tential consequences of this occurrence. 
Disposition of the 29 fuel elements which comprised the core during the loss  of 
forced-cooling flow was determined. Our analysis of possible damage to these fuel  
elements was  inconclusive. Further ,  we did not believe that visual and nondestructive 
examinations o r  additional analysis would provide more  conclusive data. The remaining 
dollar value of the elements was about $10 000. This worth was not sufficient to justify 
significant r i sk  in  their reuse  for  two reasons. (1) If one o r  more  of these fuel elements 
failed in  operation, the cost of cleanup and downtime could be more  than the potential 
savings from reusing the elements. (2) Any fission product leakage o r  g r o s s  contamina- 
tion of the pr imary  cooling water would confuse our surveillance of elements being 
burned up to  higher than previous values. Therefore, because we could not prove them 
unchanged, we did not reuse  them. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The PBR was designed with redundant protection against loss  of flow. Neverthe- 
less ,  a combination of design and personnel e r r o r s  resulted in a temporary loss  of 
forced-cooling flow. Previously analyzed conditions were  exceeded. The inspections 
and analyses conduced to evaluate the situation confirmed that an  unsafe condition had 
not been reached. Although much can be learned f rom a systematic evaluation of this  
kind of an  occurrence, a precise  determination of all conditions cannot yet be made. 
Because of the difficulty and effort required f o r  such an  analysis, and the potential f o r  
severe  damage, even a temporary loss  of forced-cooling flow is a n  undesired condition. 
The corrective actions which were taken to avoid a recurrence have proven to be effec- 
tive to date and a r e  believed sufficient f o r  the future. 
Lewis Research Center,  
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Cleveland, Ohio, October 20, 1969, 
122-29. 
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